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a b s t r a c t
The complex nature of perceived risk and the influence of perceived risks and benefits on risk acceptability
or risk taking have been analyzed in multiple ways. R. Duncan Luce made important contributions
to both normative and descriptive models of quantitative definitions of risk and risk acceptability,
concentrating on the effects of possible outcomes and their probability. Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein,
in contrast, assessed a set of qualitative and affective dimensions of perceived technological and social
risk and analyzed their effects on perceived risk and risk acceptability. The current research presents
a minimally modified replication of their 1978 study, eliciting risk perceptions from a diverse group of
US residents. After almost 40 years, we find a pattern of rank-ordered risk perceptions that remains
practically unchanged, and is still explained by two factors: dread and uncertainty. We find, however,
that today dread risk shows a greater influence than it did in the original study, and now reflects stronger
contributions of the voluntary and uncontrollable risk characteristics. We end by reflecting on themutual
impact of different types of risk research and point out promising future research directions.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Throughout his career, R. Duncan Luce took a strong interest in
risky decisions, from modeling risk taking early on (Luce & Raiffa,
1957) to later axiomatizing subjective perceptions of risk (Luce
& Weber, 1986). Most recently he proposed a p-additive utility
theory (Luce, 2010a,b) with three distinct representations that
correspond to averse, neutral, or seeking risk attitude. Davis-Stober
and Brown (2013) extended this work by allowing that decision
makers may not have an invariant risk attitude across different
situations.
The conjoint-expected-risk (CER) axiomatic model of perceived
risk makes risk a more complex construct than variability of
outcomes, allowing probabilities of gains or losses to affect
perceived risk directly and allowing for a differential effect of
upside and downside variability, with potential individual, group,
or situational differences in the weight of these components on
perceived risk (Luce & Weber, 1986). Weber, who developed the
CER model with Luce, has modeled the subjective nature of risk
in multiple other ways. A risk–return framework generalized from
Markowitz (1952) – where people’s willingness to pay (WTP) for
risky option X is a tradeoff between the option’s expected value
(return) and variance risk – allows for return and risk estimates
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4.0/).not necessarily equal to the moments of the outcome distribution
or evenmeasured onquantitative scales (Weber&Milliman, 1997).
Here risk attitude determines the trade-off between risk and
return:
Risk Taking
= f (Perceived Return, Perceived Risk, Risk Attitude). (1)
For example,
WTP(X) = V (X)− bR(X), (2)
where b describes the tradeoff between themaximization of return
andminimization of risk andmeasures a person’s risk attitude. Fac-
tors such as familiarity which will vary between choice domains,
often moderated by demographic factors such as gender or age,
have been shown to influence perceptions of risk and of benefits
(see Figner & Weber, 2011, for a recent summary).
In their domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) framework,
Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) employed the same decomposition
of risk taking (RT) as a tradeoff between perceived risks (PR) and
perceived benefits (PB) of risky choice options:
RT(X) = PB(X)− bPR(X), (3)
to account for domain-variant risk taking while still allowing for a
domain-general individual difference risk-attitude parameter, b.
Domain-specific differences in risk taking, from recreational
choices to financial, social, health/safety, and ethical decisions, can
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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ber et al., 2002) or perceived benefits (Hanoch, Johnson, Wilke,
2006). In addition, risky decisions also differ by the degree towhich
they involve ‘‘hot’’ affective processes or ‘‘cold’’ deliberative pro-
cesses (Figner,Mackinlay,Wilkening, &Weber, 2009). ‘‘Risk as feel-
ings’’ is a sufficiently widespread phenomenon to be the title of a
widely-cited review paper (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch,
2001). Analytic consideration of risk has a long history and are
captured in a normative fashion by the variance of outcomes in
the risk–return models of finance and in a descriptive fashion by
the CER model and the psychological risk–return framework. It
is worth noting that emotional or affective considerations of risk
were already examined and identified by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichten-
stein and colleagues in the 1970s, even if not explicitly presented in
this light, and thus preceded the emotions revolution of the 1990s
by a couple of decades.
Most if not all activities in everyday life carry some risk of
harm. Driving a car could lead to a crash, taking a prescription
antibiotic might cause unpleasant side effects, and living near a
nuclear power plant increases the chances of radiation exposure.
Different technologies vary both in their probability of causing
death or injury and in the benefits they offer to society to make up
for those costs—but they vary on many other dimensions as well,
and these other dimensions may carry much more weight when
it comes to our judgments about how risky different technologies
seemor feel. For example, althoughmanymore people are killed or
injured every year in car crashes than by nuclear power, the latter
still often feels more unsafe.
In their 1978 paper ‘‘How Safe is Safe Enough?’’, Fischhoff,
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs employed a psychometric
analysis to model and help explain why different technologies
and activities might inspire such different risk reactions. Taking
the position that risk can vary across many characteristics—How
immediately do the effects take place? How many people are
affected at once? How controllable do the consequences feel?—
Fischhoff et al. showed that perceptions of risk for everyday
activities and technologies tend to load onto two orthogonal
dimensions, which they called dread risk and unknown risk. Dread
risk appeared to relate to consequences that are likely to be
catastrophic, that are certain to be fatal, and that feel dreaded
on a gut level. Unknown risks were those that are new, that
are undertaken involuntarily, whose consequences are delayed,
and which seem not fully known to science or to those exposed
(Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). In later
studies, similar sets of characteristicswere found to load onto these
factors: dread risk encompassing lack of control, catastrophic and
fatal effects, a feeling of dread, and an imbalance in the distribution
of risks and benefits; and unknown risk being associated with
consequences that are unobservable, new, delayed, and unknown
to science and the exposed (e.g., Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein, 1985, 1986).
Since the 1980s, hundreds of studies have cited the concepts
of dread and unknown risk to illuminate risk perception on topics
ranging from avian flu (Gstraunthaler & Day, 2008) to genetically
modified foods (Gaskell et al., 2004), to financial decisions (Koonce,
McAnally, & Mercer, 2005). Other studies have investigated risk
perception cross-culturally using Fischhoff et al.’s (1978) frame-
work in countries such as Norway (Teigen, Brun, & Slovic, 1988),
Hungary (Englander, 1986), and Korea (Cha, 2000). However, lit-
tle work has shown how perceptions of risks for everyday tech-
nologies and activities have changed (or not) over the past three
decades, aside from studies looking at relatively specific domains
(e.g., a study of food-related hazards by Sparks & Shepherd, 1994).
We therefore have little idea of how risk perceptions or atti-
tudes may have shifted over time. Since the 1980s, the objective
risks of many of the 30 items that Fischhoff et al. (1978) studiedhave in fact changed, as have the media culture and public knowl-
edge about these risks. New technologies have emerged during
the intervening decades, bringing new risks to public awareness
and likely influencing public opinion about older technologies. Be-
tween the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle in the 1980s, the
rise in awareness of global terrorism in the United States since
2001, and the information-sharing culture encouraged by social
networking, it is reasonable to expect changes between 1978 and
today in terms of the psychological availability of various social and
technological risks, as well as the public’s knowledge about and at-
titudes toward those technologies.
The goals for this study were to replicate Fischhoff et al.’s 1978
study, and to offer a descriptive look at how risk perceptions for a
set of 30 activities and technologies have appear to have changed
over the past several decades. While we did not expect that people
today would show the same risk perceptions for those 30 items
as people did in the 1970s, we did believe that the two-factor
expressed preference framework that Fischhoff and colleagues
developed would still be effective today to illustrate and partially
quantify those perceptions of risk.
1. Method
We matched the design and content of this study as closely
as possible to Fischhoff et al. (1978), referred to hereafter as
FSLRC78. There are, however, two differences in method between
the current version of the study and the original one: one in
elicitation medium (now online vs. before on paper) and the other
in participant population (now a diverse US sample vs. before
Oregon League of Women Voters members and their husbands).
1.1. Design
Following FSLRC78, Ps evaluated 30 activities and technologies
on multiple dimensions: (1) the technology/activity’s perceived
benefit (risk) to society; (2) the acceptability of the technol-
ogy/activity’s current level of risk; and (3) its placement on each
of nine dimensions of risk. The first part of the study was varied
between Ps: some judged only the perceived benefit of each activ-
ity or technology, while others judged only the perceived risk. All
Ps then answered the same questions in Parts 2 and 3.
The list of 30 activities/technologies for Ps to judge was copied
exactly from Fischhoff et al., and can be seen in Table 1. For each
task in the study, the order in which the 30 activities/technologies
appeared was counterbalanced in a blocked Latin square design:
five blocks of six items each were shuffled so that each activ-
ity/technology appeared early in the list for some Ps, in the middle
of the list for others, and at the end of the list for others. No order
effects were detected, so order will not be discussed below.
Matching the instructions used by FSLRC78, our Ps were told
before they began their evaluations that ‘‘This is a difficult, if
not impossible, task. Nevertheless, it is not unlike the task you
face when you vote on legislation pertaining to nuclear power,
handguns, or highway safety. One never has all the relevant
information; ambiguities and uncertainties abound, yet some
judgment must be made. The present task should be approached
in the same spirit’’.
1.2. Tasks
1a. Perceived benefit. Participants in the benefits condition
were asked to judge the benefits to society of each of the 30
activities or technologies. For each, Ps were asked to ‘‘consider all
types of benefits: how many jobs are created, how much money
is generated directly or indirectly (e.g., for swimming, consider
the manufacture and sale of swimsuits), how much enjoyment is
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Mean judgments of risk and benefit from 30 activities and technologies.
Activity or technology Perceived benefit Perceived risk Risk adjustment factor
(geometric mean)
Acceptable level of
risk
(geometric mean) Risk Ps Bene. Ps Risk Ps Bene. Ps
1 Alcoholic beverages 20 39 1.0 1.0 39.1 39.3
2 Bicycles 36 20 1.6 1.1 12.8 17.7
3 Commercial aviation 51 34 0.7 0.8 46.4 41.9
4 Contraceptives 50 17 1.8 1.5 9.5 11.9
5 Electric power 86 33 1.1 1.2 30.6 28.8
6 Fire fighting 59 56 1.4 1.6 40.4 35.4
7 Food coloring 17 17 3.0 2.8 5.5 6.0
8 Food preservatives 41 17 1.1 1.4 15.1 12.2
9 General aviation 41 37 2.5 2.2 14.5 16.4
10 Handguns 26 77 1.1 1.0 67.7 73.6
11 HS & college football 22 25 0.9 1.0 27.7 26.1
12 Home appliances 42 19 0.9 1.2 22.6 16.3
13 Hunting 26 41 1.1 0.9 36.0 43.0
14 Large construction 55 38 2.7 1.5 13.9 25.0
15 Motorcycles 27 48 1.9 2.0 25.0 23.4
16 Motor vehicles 60 50 7.9 4.7 6.3 10.5
17 Mountain climbing 21 42 2.3 3.6 18.1 11.8
18 Nuclear power 58 64 2.5 2.7 25.5 24.1
19 Pesticides 32 31 0.7 1.1 44.5 29.5
20 Power mowers 27 30 0.9 1.5 32.1 19.3
21 Police work 61 54 12.4 14.7 4.4 3.7
22 Prescription antibiotics 62 20 2.3 1.5 8.5 13.0
23 Railroads 61 35 0.9 1.1 37.8 33.1
24 Skiing 21 29 12.1 7.1 2.4 4.0
25 Smoking 13 56 1.0 1.3 59.0 44.6
26 Spray cans 18 23 1.8 1.8 12.9 12.7
27 Surgery 75 45 3.4 2.6 13.4 17.2
28 Swimming 27 22 0.7 0.9 28.9 24.9
29 Vaccinations 70 20 1.6 1.9 12.2 10.6
30 X-rays 44 20 0.8 1.1 24.1 18.8
Mean of all activities/technologies: 42.4 30.3 1.6 2.7
Coefficient of Concordance 0.50 0.37 0.28 0.21brought to people, how much of a contribution is made to the
people’s health and welfare, and so on’’. Ps in this condition were
instructed to ignore risks:
Do not consider the costs of the risks associated with these
activities or technologies. It is true, for example, that swimmers
sometimes drown. But evaluating such risks and costs is not
your present job. Your job is to assess the gross benefits, not
the net benefits, which remain after the costs and risks are
subtracted out. Remember that a beneficial activity affecting
few people will have less gross benefit than a beneficial activity
affecting many people. If you need to think of a time period
during which the benefits accrue, think of a whole year—the
total value to society from each activity or technology during
one year.
The wording used for these instructions matched, as closely as
possible, the language used by FSLRC78. Some changes were made
to better fit the online nature of the task, e.g., asking Ps to click
on the name of an activity/technology to place it into a ranked list,
rather thanmoving index card into place to determine the rankings
of the 30 items.
Ps were instructed to first ‘‘study each activity or technology
individually, thinking of all the benefits of each’’. Then Ps were
asked to place the 30 activities/technologies in order of increasing
benefit by clicking on each of the 30 items to move it into their
ranked list. Ps could adjust the list until they felt it accurately
reflected their judgments of the rankings of benefit. Once this
had been done, Ps were asked to assign a numerical value for the
perceived benefits of each item, with the least beneficial (the first
item on their list) assigned the value of 10, and other items judged
relative to that. Ps were encouraged to take their time on this
portion of the task, and given detailed instructions about how to
assign values:If you feel that an item is twice as beneficial as the least
beneficial item, assign it a 20. This means that a rating of 12
indicates that the item is 1.2 times as beneficial as the least
beneficial item (this means it is 20% more beneficial). A rating
of 200 means that the item is 20 times as beneficial as the least
beneficial item, to which you assigned a 10. Please take some
time on this question, and double-check your ratings to make
sure that they are consistent. For example, if one activity is rated
a 50 and a second is rated 100, the second item should seem
twice as beneficial as the first. Adjust the numbers until you feel
that they are right for you.
1b. Perceived risk. Participants in the risks condition were
given very similar instructions to those of the benefits Ps, except
that they were asked to consider the ‘‘the risks of the activities
and technologies listed below. Consider the risk of dying as a
consequence of this activity or technology. For example, use
of electricity carries the risk of electrocution. It also entails
risk for miners who produce the coal that generates electricity.
Motor vehicles entail risk for drivers, passengers, bicyclists, and
pedestrians, etc.’’. Just as the benefits Ps were instructed not to
consider risks, the risks Ps were instructed that ‘‘Your job is to
assess the gross risks, not the net risks which remain after the
benefits are subtracted out’’. As before, the language used in this
section was modeled on the task used by FSLRC78.
2. Risk adjustment factor. After judging either the risks or
benefits of the 30 activities and technologies, all Ps were asked
to decide for each activity/technology ‘‘whether the associated
risks are either too high, at an acceptable level, or too low’’. As in
FSLRC78, Ps were told:
Almost any activity or technology carries some amount of risk,
but this is not the ideal risk. Ideally, the risks should be zero. The
acceptable level is a level that is ‘‘good enough’’, where ‘‘good
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safety are not worth the costs of reducing risk by restricting
or otherwise altering the activity. For example, we can make
drugs ‘‘safer’’ by restricting their potency; or lower speed limits
to make cars safer, but all of these improvements come at
a price. We may, or may not, feel restrictions are necessary.
If an activity’s present level of risk is acceptable, no special
action need be taken to increase its safety. If its riskiness is
unacceptably high, serious action, such as legislation to restrict
its practice, should be taken. On the other hand, there may be
some activities or technologies that you believe are currently
safer than the acceptable level of risk. For those activities, the
risk of death could be higher than it is now before societywould
have to take serious action.
For each activity or technology, Ps could choose among ‘‘(a)
Could be riskier’’, or ‘‘(b) It is presently acceptable’’, or ‘‘(c) Too
risky’’. If (a) was selected, an additional question appeared on the
screen, asking the P to fill in the blank in the statement ‘‘It would
be acceptable if it were _____ times riskier’’. If (c) was selected,
the P instead saw the question ‘‘To be acceptable, it would have
to be ____ times safer’’. If (b) was selected, no additional questions
appeared, and the P wouldmove on to judging the risks of the next
activity or technology. As piloting revealed this task to be taxing,
the 30 items in this section appeared in blocks of 6 items on 5
separate pages, allowing Ps to take a short break between blocks
if they wished.
3. Characteristics of risk. In the final section, Ps were asked
to judge each technology or activity on each of nine scales
representing different characteristics of risk. Each characteristic,
measured on a seven-point scale, was assessed for all 30
activities/technologies beforemoving on to the next characteristic.
The order and wording of the nine scales closely matched those
used in the original 1978 study:
1. How Voluntary is the Risk? For the activities and technologies
listed below, please indicate whether you think people take
on the potential risks voluntarily. If for a particular activity
some of the risks are voluntarily undertaken and some are not,
choose an appropriate rating toward the center of the scale.
(1= voluntary, 7= involuntary).
2. How Immediate is the Risk? For the activities and technologies
listed below, to what extent is the risk of death or injury
immediate—or is death or injury likely to occur at some later
time? (1= immediate, 7= delayed).
3. KnowledgeAbout Risk: For the activities and technologies listed
below, to what extent are the risks known precisely by the
persons who are exposed to those risks? (1= known precisely,
7= not known).
4. Scientific Knowledge About Risk: For the activities and tech-
nologies listed below, to what extent are the risks known to sci-
ence? (1= known precisely, 7= not known).
5. Control Over Risk: If you are exposed to the risk of each activity
or technology listed below, to what extent can you, by personal
skill or diligence, avoid death or serious injury while engaging
in the activity? (1= uncontrollable, 7= controllable).
6. Newness of Risk: For the activities and technologies listed
below, are the risks new and novel ones, or old and familiar
ones? (1= new, 7= old).
7. Chronic vs. Catastrophic Risk: For the activities and technolo-
gies listed below, is it a risk that kills people one at a time (a
chronic risk, meaning the risk is continual over time) or a risk
that kills large numbers of people at once (a catastrophic risk)?
(1= chronic, 7= catastrophic).
8. Common Risk vs. Dread Risk: Is each of the activities and
technologies listed below a risk that people have learned to
live with and can think about reasonably calmly, or is it one
that people have great dread for—on the level of a gut reaction?
(1= common, 7= dread).9. Severity of Consequences: And finally, when the risk of each
activity is realized in the form of a mishap or illness, how likely
is it that the consequences will be fatal? (1 = certain not to be
fatal, 7= certain to be fatal).
After completing these three parts of the study, Ps answered basic
demographic questions and received debriefing information. Ps
were paid $3 for participation in the study.
1.3. Participants
The 83 participants (Ps) were recruited through Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk online labor market in August of 2013. Mean com-
pletion time for the studywas about 90min.We omitted data from
any Ps whose answers to attention-check questions indicated that
they were clearly not reading instructions: eight Ps were removed
from analysis in this way. This relatively low rate is consistent with
recent research indicating thatMTurk participantsmaybemore at-
tentive to instructions than undergraduates completing studies in
person (Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016).
Of the remaining 75 Ps (36 female, 37 male, 2 unspecified),
42 were randomly assigned to the ‘‘benefits’’ condition, and 33
Ps to the ‘‘risks’’ condition. Ps’ mean age was 36.1 (sd = 12.5),
with 57.5% having earned a bachelor’s or associate’s degree, 27.4%
having earned a high-school diploma, and 15.1% having earned a
master’s degree or higher. These demographics make our sample
reasonably representative of the United States population over-
all,1 which is consistent with general findings that participants re-
cruited on MTurk are much more diverse than the typical sample
of college students and are slightly more diverse than other online
samples (see, e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The polit-
ical beliefs of our Ps, on the other hand, skewmore liberal than the
US population: 52.1% identify as Democrats, 30.1% identify as In-
dependents, and 16.4% identify as Republicans, compared to a na-
tionwide average of 31% Democrats, 43% Independents, and 24%
Republicans in August of 2013 (Gallup, 2015).
FSLRC78 do not provide a specific breakdown of demographic
information on their sample population, so we cannot directly
compare our sample to theirs. We must therefore be cautious
when comparing the results of the two studies. But based on
the fact that the 1978 participants were members of the League
of Women Voters and their spouses, we make two assumptions
about the comparability of the two samples. One assumption is
that the Oregon League of Women Voters shared our participants’
leftward lean in politics (at least in direction of skew, if not in
strength), in line with FSLRC78’s description of the League as ‘‘a
generally liberal, environmentally minded group’’. Such a skew
would lead us to expect similar priorities in attitudes across
the two groups, and therefore a similar rank-ordering of items
in terms of perceived risk. The second assumption is that the
population of the League ofWomenVoters in Oregon is likelymore
homogeneous, and less nationally representative, than our sample
of MTurk workers from across the US. We would therefore expect
our relatively more diverse sample to showmore heterogeneity in
their risk perceptions and attitudes.
2. Results and discussion
2.1. Perceived risk and benefit
Geometric means of perceived risk and perceived benefit for
each of the 30 activities/technologies are shown in Table 1.
1 As of 2013, 29.5% of US adults over 18 had a high-school diploma, 28% had a
bachelor’s or associates degree, and 10.2% had a master’s degree or higher, per:
https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2013/tables.html.
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shows no significant correlation: y = 33.1+ 0.054x, r2 = 0.005, p > 0.10.
The range of judgments of perceived benefit and perceived risk
in our study is much smaller than in Fischhoff et al. (1978)
(FSLRC78): maximum benefits and risks in FSLRC78 were 274 and
250, respectively; here they were 86 and 77 (see supplementary
material for a table comparing Table 1 between 1978 and the
current study). Neither study constricted the range for perceived
risk and benefit values, except to specify that the lowest-ranked
item for risk (or benefit) should be assigned a value of 10, and that
other judgments should be made based on that value. Participants
could, therefore, assign to risks and benefits any value between 10
and infinity.
Although our Ps used a more limited range of values, the activ-
ities/technologies’ rank order for the 1978 results and the current
data correlate strongly with each other (for benefits: ρ = 0.91,
p < 0.001; for risks: ρ = 0.83, p < 0.001). That is, across
both studies the same activities/technologies in both studies fall in
roughly the same order. As a result, we see similar items appear-
ing at both extremes of the perceived benefit scale (lowest benefit:
smoking, food coloring, spray cans; highest benefit: electric power,
vaccinations, antibiotics) just as the same activities/technologies
tend to cluster at each end of the perceived risk ratings (lowest
risk: food coloring & preservatives, appliances, vaccinations; high-
est risk: handguns, nuclear power, smoking).
Consistent with FSLRC78, there is no significant relationship in
this study between perceived risk and benefit, as shown in Fig. 1.
(For a comparison of risk and benefit ratings between 1978 and
now, see supplementary material.)
2.2. Risk-adjustment factor
Judgments of whether the risks associated with each activity/
technology ‘‘could be higher’’, ‘‘must be lower’’, or were ‘‘presently
acceptable’’ were used to calculate a risk-adjustment factor (RAF)
for each activity/technology for each P . For risks that a P considered
too high, the RAF was calculated as the value they entered to
finish the statement ‘‘must be __ _ times safer to be acceptable’’.
For risks that a P believed could be higher, RAF was calculated
as the multiplicative reciprocal of the value that finished thestatement ‘‘would be acceptable if it were ___ times higher’’. For
activities/technologies that Ps judged as ‘‘presently acceptable’’,
RAF was set to 1.0. Thus, RAF values greater than 1.0 indicate
that current risk of the activity or technology is too high and
must be lowered, and RAF values less than 1.0 mean that the
risk could be higher. Table 1 shows the geometric mean RAF for
those Ps who had previously judged risks, versus those who had
previously judged benefits (geometric means were used, as in
FSRLC78, because they are more resistant to skewing by large
outliers than arithmetic means are). The risk-adjustment task was
identical for these two groups, and a paired t-test shows that RAF
does not differ between the groups (t(29) = 0.82, p > 0.05).
Of the 2250 total risk judgments, 7.7% were ‘‘could be riskier’’,
while 66.4% of judgments were ‘‘appropriately risky’’ and 25.8%
were ‘‘should be safer’’. While the proportion of ‘‘could be
riskier’’ activities/technologies does not appear to be substantially
different from that same proportion in 1978 (Fischhoff et al. found
it to be 10%), the values for the other two judgment categories
represent a trend toward activities and technologies being judged
as less risky since 1978: FSRLC78 found that only 40% of their Ps’
judgments were ‘‘appropriately risky’’, while 50% were ‘‘should be
safer’’.
There may be several reasons for this shift of activities/technol-
ogies from ‘‘should be safer’’ to ‘‘appropriately risky’’. It may
be that the standard for acceptable risk levels has changed.
Participants in the original 1978 study were ‘‘a generally liberal,
environmentally minded group’’ drawn from a socially aware
population (theOregon League ofWomenVoters), and it is possible
that such a population would set a lower threshold for what risk
level constitutes ‘‘appropriately risky’’ vs. ‘‘should be safer’’. It is
perhaps more likely, though, that the decrease in ‘‘should be safer’’
judgments is due to the fact that the risks for many of the 30
activities and technologies have indeeddecreased over time, due to
increased regulation or advances in technology. Smoking rates, for
example, have nearly halved since the 1970s, dropping from34% in
1978 to 19% in 2011 (CDC, 2011b), and although the risk of death
among smokers rose precipitously between 1959 and 2010, the
death rate attributed to smoking has dropped overall in that time
period (USDHHS, 2014). Similarly, although handgun death rates
remain higher in the United States than in many other Western
nations, the per-capita risk of firearms death has dropped from a
peak of 16 per 100,000 in 1975 to 10.4 per 100,000 in 2011 (CDC,
2011a; FICAP, 2011).
FSLRC78 found that the mean perceived risk ratings from the
group that judged risk correlated significantly with mean RAF
both among Ps who had originally rated benefits and those who
had rated risks (r = 0.75 and r = 0.66, respectively). The greater
the mean perceived risk of an activity, the more people would
want that risk reduced (higher RAF scores indicate a greater
desired reduction in risk), both for participantswho had previously
considered only the benefits and those who had only considered
the risks of that activity. In the current study, in contrast, we did
not see a significant correlation between RAF and perceived risk
for either group: r = 0.25 for benefit Ps, r = 0.19 for risk Ps,
both p′s > 0.05. In other words, our participants did not feel
that the higher-risk activities/technologies needed to be reduced
proportionally more than the lower-risk activities/technologies.
For example, although handguns were ranked as the technology
with the highest perceived risk (77), the RAFs for handguns are 1.1
and 1.0, indicating that this high risk level is currently acceptable.
Other activities/technologieswith RAFs very close to 1 are smoking
(perceived risk = 56), hunting (perceived risk = 41), alcohol
(perceived risk = 39), and x-rays (perceived risk = 20). This
range of risks that are all considered presently acceptable clearly
illustrates the lack of correlation between perceived risk and RAF,
even if it does not explain the disappearance of this effect since the
1978 study.
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calculated for each activity/technology by dividing its perceived
risk (averaged across the Ps who judged risk) by the risk-
adjustment factor (see the final two columns in Table 1). In this
way, activities/technologies thatwere judged as currently too risky
have a lower acceptable risk level than the current perceived
risk, and activities/technologies that were judged as safer than
necessary end up with an acceptable risk that is higher than the
current risk. For example, motor vehicles received a risk score
of 50 and a RAF of 7.9 from the Ps who judged risks, indicating
that the risk would need to be nearly 8 times lower in order to
be acceptable. This results in an acceptable risk score of 6.3, or
(50÷ 7.9). On the other hand, pesticides, with their perceived risk
of 31 and ‘‘could be riskier’’ RAF of 0.7, indicate an acceptable risk
of 44.5, which is higher than the currently judged risk.
Fischhoff et al. (1978) found this mean acceptable risk level to
correlate positively, if not strongly, with mean perceived benefit
(r = 0.42 for Ps who had previously rated risks, and r = 0.31 for
Ps who had previously rated benefits), i.e., that higher perceived
benefits allowed for higher acceptable risk levels. Given that the
current study found no relationship between perceived risk and
RAF, it is not surprising that we fail to replicate these correlations
with acceptable risk level, given our difference in RAF scores. The
acceptable risks did not correlate with perceived benefit among
Ps who had previously judged benefits (r = −0.12, p = 0.39),
nor did they among Ps who judged risks (r = −0.19, p = 0.22).
It is slightly surprising that both of these correlations would be
negative when the original relationships were found to be positive
(although weak), but given that neither relationship is statistically
significant, we cannot readmuch into the apparent direction of the
effects.
2.3. Inter-participant agreement
We find moderate inter-participant agreement for both per-
ceived benefit and perceived risk across all 30 activities/technolog-
ies: Kendall’s coefficient of concordance is 0.50 for perceived
benefit and 0.37 for perceived risk. The agreement among our par-
ticipants is not as substantial as in FSLRC78 (1978 values:Wbenefit =
0.77,Wrisk = 0.50), but both values are significantly different from
zero, p < 0.001. This pattern of lower inter-participant agreement
is not surprising, considering the relative diversity of our popula-
tion compared to the fairly homogeneous group that Fischhoff and
colleagues sampled.
The inter-participant agreement for the risk-adjustment factor
(RAF) is weaker than for perceived risk and benefit, but still
significant: W = 0.28 among benefit Ps, and W = 0.21 among
risk Ps, p < 0.001. As with perceived risk and perceived benefit,
these coefficients of concordance in our nationally representative
sample show relatively less agreement than among Fischhoff and
colleagues’ more homogeneous participant group (their values:
WRAFb = 0.50,WRAFr = 0.50).
2.4. Nine characteristics of risk
Participants in both conditions judged the 30 activities/techno-
logies on the same nine scales (see Table 2). As in FSLRC78, the
scores from the risk and benefit participants for this task do not
differ substantially from each other (only one difference, out of the
270, is greater than 1.0; the mean absolute difference across all
judgments is 0.31), and so we pooled the data from the two groups
for the remaining analyses.
Inter-participant agreement. As with the risk and benefit
judgments and risk-adjustment factors, the agreement on the nine
risk scales is generally lower than it was among Fischhoff and
colleagues’ participants, although in each case it is still significantlydifferent from zero. Where the 1978 data show coefficients of
concordancemostly between 0.4 and 0.6, here eight out of the nine
characteristics see a concordance of W = 0.24 to W = 0.42.
The notable exception is for the ‘‘known to science’’ characteristic:
here the concordance is a very high W = 0.76, compared to only
W = 0.30 or W = 0.35 (for benefit and risk Ps, respectively)
in Fischhoff and colleagues’ data. This may be a reflection of the
(perceived or actual) advances in technology in the past three
decades, which has led both to a significantly lower mean score
and lower variance on ‘‘known to science’’ (this characteristic may
bemore readily understood as degree of being unknown to science,
where 1= ‘‘known precisely’’ and 7= ‘‘not at all known’’, but here
we follow the nomenclature of the original FSLRC78 study), and
greater interparticipant agreement abut which items are better
known than others. Interestingly,mean scores on the characteristic
of ‘‘known to those exposed’’ have also shifted significantly toward
‘‘known precisely’’ since 1978, but the concordance (W = 0.31)
is substantially lower than that for ‘‘known to science’’, reflecting
a perception that on average the public knows more now about
these 30 technologies and activities than they did in the 1970s, yet
indicating a lack in unanimity over the relative ranking of the 30
items in terms of which are now most precisely known.
This shift in the concordance for this single risk characteristic is
striking, and may in fact help to explain the finding that perceived
risk is no longer correlated with risk-adjustment factor. Although
both knowledge characteristics (known to the exposed, known to
science) have significantly lower mean scores today than in 1978
(see Table 2), the ratings for ‘‘known to science’’ are nearly all
approaching the ‘‘known precisely’’ end. Thus, the consensus today
appears to be that, as we would expect, the risks of every one of
these 30 activities/technologies are all verywell understood by the
scientific community.
Our Ps’ judgments also indicate a significant shift toward
more knowledge of the risks among those exposed to them, and
toward risks being assumed more voluntarily than in the past—
though there is more variation between activities/technologies
for these variables than there is within the ‘‘known to science’’
characteristic. These shifts are consistent with our expectations:
over the past three decades, science does indeed knowmore about
the risks of these activities and technologies, as does the general
public, and thus those peoplewhoare at risk aremore likely to have
placed themselves knowingly and voluntarily in that situation.
It is also logical that overall, the 30 activities/technologies are
seen as both more controllable and less new today than they
were several decades ago. The shift that may seem somewhat
counterintuitive is the one toward more catastrophic as opposed
to chronic risk. Overall, this trend suggests that the risks of these
30 activities/technologies are more likely to affect large numbers
of people at once, as opposed to one at a time. It is tempting
to guess that increasing population and population density may
contribute to this increase in catastrophic risk potential, but to fully
understand this shift, it may be necessary to look at differences
between the studies for specific activities/technologies. Only five
out of the 30 activities/technologies appear to have shifted toward
the chronic (lower) end of the 1–7 scale, and only three of those
shifts are greater than 1/3 of a point: spray cans (−1.26), pesticides
(−0.94), and nuclear power (−0.46). Given increased regulation of
aerosol cans and pesticides, and a temporal remove from large-
scale nuclear disasters like Chernobyl, a move away from the
catastrophic end of the scale seems to make sense. (Note that
nuclear power, despite the nearly half-point drop in catastrophic
risk, is still considered extremely catastrophic at 5.97 on the
7-point scale.) By contrast, the activities and technologies that have
increased the most toward the catastrophic end of the scale are
general aviation (+2.0), handguns (+1.94) andmountain climbing
and skiing (+1.56 and +1.44, respectively). As of the fall of 2013,
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Pairwise correlations among the 9 risk characteristics. Variable pairs that were correlated (at α = 0.001) in Fischhoff et al.’s 1978 data are underlined here.
Immediate Known (exposed) Known (science) Controllable New Chronic Common Severe
Voluntary 0.37 0.64** 0.43 −0.80** −0.71** 0.39 0.39 −0.02
Immediate 0.77** 0.55* −0.13 −0.69** −0.34 −0.28 −0.62**
Known (exposed) 0.85** −0.36 −0.86** −0.09 −0.19 −0.67**
Known (science) −0.18 −0.67** −0.13 −0.27 −0.67**
Controllable 0.53* −0.63** −0.70** −0.33
New −0.06 −0.19 0.39
Chronic 0.68** 0.68**
Common 0.75**
* p < 0.005.
** p < 0.001.when this study was run, airplane crashes and mass shootings
were concepts with high psychological availability, which would
contribute to higher perceptions of catastrophic risk (Johnson &
Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The United States saw
vivid examples of these risks in an Asiana Airlines flight crashing
short of the runway at San Francisco International airport on July
6, 2013 (Onishi, Drew, Wald, & Nir, 2013), and a mass shooting
on July 26, 2013 in Florida that left 7 people dead (Madigan,
2013). Similarly, the perceptions of catastrophic risk for both
skiing and mountain climbing may have increased partly due to
the availability of vivid stories from, among other incidents, the
April, 2013 Sheep Creek avalanche, which killed 5 people; and the
February, 2012 Tunnel Creek avalanche, which killed 3 skiers and
was profiled in an extensive and interactive multimedia piece on
NYTimes.com in December of 2012.
Correlations among the risk characteristics. As expected, the
nine characteristics of risk are highly inter-correlated (see Table 3),
in away similar to FSLRC78: 14 of the 17 pairs that show significant
correlations in our current studywere also significantly correlated,
in the same direction, in the 1978 study. Of the five additional
pairs of characteristics that were correlated in 1978 but are not
in this current study, all show moderate, though non-significant,
correlations in the same direction as in 1978. Even though the
correlations in both studies were evaluated at a conservative alpha
level of 0.001 to correct for multiple comparisons, we are hesitant
tomake specific comparisons between the two studies on the basis
of such a large number of individual tests. Instead, wewill focus on
the ability of the current risk dimension data to predict perceived
risk, benefit, and acceptable risk.
Relationship of the nine risk characteristics with perceived
risk and benefit. Perceived risk and perceived benefit correlate
with many of the nine risk characteristic scores individually, but
given the multicollinearity among the nine characteristics, we
will not attempt to interpret the individual correlations.2 Using
a multiple linear regression model, perceived benefit is predicted
only by scores on the voluntary scale: for every one-point increase
on that seven-point scale, the perceived benefit increases by 15.6
points. In other words, the more involuntary the activity, the
greater the perceived benefit. This is a substantial effect, given
that the maximummean benefit score was 86 (for electric power),
on a scale where 10 represents the benefit of the lowest-ranked
technology or activity (the lowest mean benefit was smoking,
coming in at 13). It may seem counterintuitive that involuntary
activities carry higher benefits, but this relationship may make
2 Correlation tables are presented in the supplementary material to this paper.
The differences in the apparent relationships among the four outcome variables and
the nine risk characteristics as indicated by the individual correlations, compared
to the relationships indicated by the linear models, shows the importance of
controlling for the effects of other, correlated predictor variables in situations
like this one—relationships that appear to be substantial and significant in the
correlation tables are negligible when controlling for the other risk characteristics,
and vice versa.more sense when viewed in the opposite direction: the higher
the benefit of a risky technology or activity, the more likely may
it be imposed upon members of society. While this relationship
between voluntariness and perceived benefit was not significant
in FSLRC78, it was in the same direction (r = 0.24).
Several of the risk characteristics predict scores on perceived
risk. As with benefits, (in)voluntariness has a positive relationship
with perceived risk: for every one-point shift toward involuntary,
perceived risk increases by 10.2 points. We also see an effect
of newness: for every one-point shift toward an activity or
technology being newer, there is a 14.4-point increase in perceived
risk. There is a similarly strong effect of controllability, in which
a one-point move toward an activity/technology being more
controllable is associated with a 14.7-point jump in perceived risk.
Although knowledge to science does not predict risk perception,
knowledge to the exposed does: a one-point shift toward precise
knowledge of an activity/technology’s risks predicts a 17.3-point
increase in perceived risk. Taken together, these relationships
suggest that riskier activities and technologies tend to be more
involuntarily undertaken, newer, more controllable, and more
precisely known to those exposed to the risk. This profile is
consistent with the highest perceived risk scores going to activities
and technologies that are typically taken on knowingly: handguns,
nuclear power, smoking, fire fighting, police work, and motor
vehicles top the rank list of perceived risk.
In FSLRC78, only the risk characteristics of dread and sever-
ity were found to be significantly correlated with perceived risk
(r = 0.64 and r = −0.67, respectively); although we did not find
significant contributions of either of these characteristics in our
linear model (see Table 4), we do see effects in the same direc-
tion. Of the characteristics that do significantly predict perceived
risk scores in our model, only one (known to exposed) showed a
moderate, though not significant, correlation in the same direction
(r = −0.20) with perceived risk in FSLRC78. All of the other char-
acteristics that significantly contribute to the linear model of per-
ceived risk were close to zero in FSLRC78, including voluntariness
(r = 0.08), controllability (r = −0.04), and newness (r = 0.05).
This linearmodel of perceived risk does not, therefore, replicate
FSLRC78’s finding that perceived risk correlates directly with
(only) dread and severity. Although we do see strong individual
correlations between these two risk characteristics and perceived
risk in the current dataset in the same direction as seen in the 1978
data (see supplementary material), these relationships disappear
when the other risk characteristics are controlled for. Additionally,
the nine risk characteristics do a markedly better job at predicting
perceived risk (adjusted r2 = 0.82) than perceived benefit
(adjusted r2 = 0.44). This effect is consistent with the finding that
in this study, perceptions of risk and benefit are unrelated to each
other, and the fact that the nine characteristics were designed to
be measures of risk, not of benefit.
Factor analysis of the 9 risk characteristics.We ran a principal
components factor analysis to see whether our participants’
responses on the nine scales loaded onto the same two factors that
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Linearmodels predicting perceived risk and benefit by scores on the nine risk characteristics. Theminimum
score for perceived risk and perceived benefit is 10; the maximummean scores for benefit and risk are 86
and 77, respectively. Note that, for this analysis, scores on the 9 characteristics were mean-centered, so the
intercepts represent the perceived risk and benefit score for a technology or activity that is ‘‘average’’ on
all nine characteristics.
Perceived benefit (β) Perceived risk (β)
Intercept 41.6 35.3
Voluntariness 1 = voluntary 15.6* 10.2**
Immediacy 1 = immediate −6.53 1.36
Known to exposed 1 = known precisely −11.7 −17.3*
Known to science 1 = known precisely −24.9 1.81
Controllability 1 = uncontrollable −8.81 14.7***
Newness 1 = new −8.75 −14.4**
Chronic–catastrophic 1 = chronic 4.32 2.26
Common-dread 1 = common −8.17 3.07
Severity of consequences 1 = certain not fatal −16.2 7.43
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.82
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.Table 5
Factor loadings for the nine risk characteristics for the current study.
Voluntary Immediate Known
(exposed)
Known
(science)
Controllable New Chronic Common Severe λ
(loadings)
Proportion of
variance
Factor 1 0.64 0.83 0.98 0.85 −0.34 −0.88 −0.18 −0.20 −0.70 4.23 0.47
Factor 2 0.65 −0.18 0.03 −0.10 −0.88 −0.31 0.85 0.90 0.67 3.31 0.37
Commonality 0.83 0.71 0.96 0.74 0.90 0.87 0.75 0.85 0.94Table 6
Factor loadings for the nine risk characteristics from Fischhoff et al. (1978).
Voluntary Immediate Known
(exposed)
Known
(science)
Controllable New Chronic Common Severe λ
(loadings)
Proportion of
variance
Factor 1 0.89 0.70 0.88 0.88 −0.83 −0.87 0.62 0.67 0.11 5.30 0.59
Factor 2 0.03 −0.45 −0.39 −0.28 −0.24 0.14 0.55 0.6 0.91 1.91 0.21
Commonality 0.79 0.69 0.93 0.86 0.75 0.78 0.69 0.81 0.84Table 7
Differences in factor loadings between the current study and those from Fischhoff et al. (1978). Positive values indicate a loading that is higher (or has shifted from negative
to positive) in the present study compared to in 1978; negative values indicate a loading that is lower (or has shifted from positive to negative).
Voluntary Immediate Known (exposed) Known (science) Controllable New Chronic Common Severe
Factor 1 −0.25 0.13 0.10 −0.03 0.49 −0.01 −0.80 −0.87 −0.81
Factor 2 0.62 0.27 0.42 0.18 −0.64 −0.45 0.30 0.30 −0.24Fischhoff and colleagues called ‘‘Technological Risk’’ and ‘‘Severity’’
(1978), and that in subsequent studies have also at times been
called ‘‘Unknown Risk’’ and ‘‘Dread Risk’’, respectively (Slovic,
1987). Following Fischhoff et al., we computed the factor analysis
on the pooled data (risk and benefits groups, combined), and
did not find any improvements in interpretability by applying a
varimax rotation. As Tables 5 and 6 show, the unrotated factor
loadings and communality scores for the nine characteristics are
similar to the 1978 results.
In the current study, the two orthogonal factors together ac-
count for 84% of the variance, and the two-factor solution appears
sufficient to explain the correlations among the variables (a third
factor explains only an additional 6% of the variance). Although a
direct comparison of the two factor analyses would require sam-
ple sizes much larger than used in either the 1978 study or the
current study, it does look qualitatively as if the current study has
captured the same or very similar factors. One notable difference
between the two factor analyses is the relative strength of loadings
of the two factors: whereas in the original study Factor 1 (techno-
logical/unknown risk) accounted for nearly three times as much
of the variance as Factor 2 (severity/dread risk), here the division
is more even: Factor 1 explains 47%, while Factor 2 explains 37%.
This greater balance of the explanatory power of the two factorsmakes sense: as technologyhas advanced in thepast three decades,
perhaps an increase (actual or perceived) in scientific and public
knowledge about the risks has led to decreased impact of the un-
known factor, while the 24-hour news cycle may have contributed
to an increased influence in the dread factor.
Here, Factor 1 appears to capture delayed consequences, lack
of knowledge (of the exposed and of science), newness, non-
fatal consequences, and to a lesser extent, involuntariness. As
the differences between the factor loadings in Table 7 illustrate,
this unknown risk factor is therefore missing the components of
chronic (as opposed to catastrophic) risk and dread risk that loaded
onto it in FSLRC78, though it now captures the characteristic of
severity, which did not load substantially onto unknown risk in
1978. In contrast with the trimming of the loadings on Factor 1,
Factor 2 captures more variables in our current study than it did
in 1978: catastrophic, dread, and uncontrollable, and to a slightly
lesser extent involuntary and fatal. This shift toward substantial
loadings for more of the variables on Factor 2 leads to the increase
in the proportion of the overall variance that it explains.
By using the loadings on each of the two factors of each of the
30 activities and technologies, we can create a risk factor space
that allows for visual depiction of the activities/technologies along
the axes of Factor 1 (unknown risk) and Factor 2 (dread risk or
166 K.T. Fox-Glassman, E.U. Weber / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 75 (2016) 157–169Fig. 2. Factor space for the 30 activities and technologies.severity). The placement of the 30 activities/technologies in Fig. 2
is somewhat similar to the corresponding figure fromFischhoff and
colleagues’ paper (1978, Figure 7). Although the sample sizes of this
study and the original do not give us enough power to compare
the two factor analyses quantitatively, there do appear to be a few
noticeable differences between the two.
Some items, such as surgery and contraceptives, appear not to
have moved much at all compared to their positions four decades
ago. The most dramatic difference between 1978 and today is
nuclear power’s drop on the unknown axis: it has gone from being
a notable outlier on both factors to ranking only 10th out of the
30 items on unknown risk. Fig. 3 highlights this movement in
the factor space for nuclear power, as well as some other notable
shifts for some of the other activities and technologies. Pesticides
and spray cans have also moved down in unknown risk since
1978, which may illustrate the public’s growing comfort with
both technologies; regulation of pesticide use and labeling for
food products was tightened dramatically by Congress in 1996
(The Food Quality Protection Act, 1996), and the 1987 Montreal
Protocol led to international regulation of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), causing spray cans to become much less environmentally
harmful and in fact leading to a drop in the atmospheric chlorine
levels starting in 1998 (Nangle, 1989; UN, 2010).
In contrast to pesticides and spray cans, vaccinations and high-
school and college football have each increased markedly in both
dread and unknown risk, and it is not hard to imagine why. With
the recent increase in public attention to the prevalence of con-
cussions in football, the public likely does now know much more
clearly just how much is currently unknown about the long-term
health risks associatedwithhead trauma (Delaney, Lacroix, Leclerc,
& Johnston, 2002). Vaccines, on the other hand, have certainly in-
creased in both safety and effectiveness since 1978—but although
science has come to an overwhelming consensus, the public con-
versation remains dominated bymany loud (if uninformed) voices
questioning thewisdom of vaccination. A look at the two risk char-
acteristics related to knowledge nicely illustrates this gap, with
the rating of vaccinations as ‘‘known to science’’ leaning toward‘‘known precisely’’ at 2.68, but the rating for ‘‘known to those ex-
posed’’ a much more ambivalent 4.27. In general, items tend to
be rated as more precisely known to science than to the exposed,
indicating (likely accurate) belief that the public has a less com-
prehensive understanding of the risks of these technologies than
does the scientific community. For vaccines, however, this gap be-
tween the ratings on ‘‘known to science’’ and on ‘‘known to the
exposed’’ is larger than for any other technology—there is a sub-
stantial difference of 1.59 between ‘‘science’’ and ‘‘the exposed’’ for
vaccines, while the mean difference between these two character-
istics across all technologies is only 0.80.
Other items appear to have dropped considerably on the dread
axis: although all of the transportation-related technologies have
come down on both dread and unknown, commercial aviation has
shifted the farthest. Again, this difference is consistent with actual
trends over the past decades. Despite several memorable crashes
in recent years, the number of aviation accidents and deaths have
both steadily declined since the 1970s, even while passenger load
has grown dramatically (Tolan, Patterson, & Johnson, 2014). So
while commercial aviation still ranks second highest on the dread
factor, it is no longer quite the outlier it was in 1978.
Fig. 4 shows the mean scores on each of the nine risk charac-
teristics for vaccinations, compared with three other technologies:
nuclear power (which is more dread/severe but slightly less un-
known), food preservatives (which, like vaccinations, fall at the
mean of the dread/severe axis, but rate as somewhat more un-
known than vaccinations), and pesticides (which are about even
with vaccinations on the unknown axis, but considered substan-
tially more dread/severe). While vaccinations and food preserva-
tives share a very similar profile across the nine characteristics, the
difference between the two technologies on the unknown factor
can be seen in the higher scores for vaccinations on immediate-
delayed, uncontrollable–controllable, and both known–unknown
characteristics. Similarly, we can see the components of the
dread/severe factor in the differences between vaccinations and
pesticides: the latter is more involuntary, catastrophic, dread, and
certain to be fatal.
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in this study to analyze these shifts quantitatively, they should be considered as rough qualitative estimates.Table 8
Linear models predicting acceptable risk and perceived risk as a function of the two risk factors.
Acceptable risk
(β)
Perceived risk
(β)
Acceptable risk
(β)
Perceived risk
(β)
Intercept 24.2 35.3 28.4 39.6
Factor 1 (unknown) −3.15* −4.48*** −2.97* −4.30***
Factor 2 (dread) 2.56 4.36*** 3.11 4.92***
Perceived benefit – – −0.10 −0.10
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.60 0.19 0.59
* p < 0.05. ∗∗ p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.2.5. Multivariate determination of acceptable risk levels
Following Fischhoff and colleagues’ successful attempt to
predict acceptable risk levels using perceived benefit along with
Factor 1 and Factor 2, we tested a model that predicts scores of
acceptable risk on the 30 activities and technologies as a function
of our factors of unknown risk and dread risk. We find that
the two factors together do a moderately good job of predicting
acceptable risk level (F(27) = 4.81, p = 0.017, R2 = 0.21), though
adding perceived benefit to the model does not add any additional
predictive power (see Table 8). The two factors do a better job at
predicting perceived risk (F(27) = 22.8, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.60),
but again, adding perceived benefit as a predictor does not improve
the model.
Perceived benefit does not add to these models’ predictive
power, but the model of perceived risk quite nicely shows the
relationship between the two factors in terms of their influence
on risk perception. While increases on Factor 1 (toward more
unknown) lead to lower perception of risk, equivalent increases
on Factor 2 (toward higher dread) are associated with the same
magnitude of change in perceived risk, but toward higher risk. In
other words, the more known and the more dread a risk is, thehigher the perceived risk. This relationship allows us to consider
the risk space in Fig. 2 as having perceived risk increase roughly
from the upper left quadrant to the lower right, as in Fig. 5.
3. Conclusions
Our results are consistent with the view that perceived risk is
influenced by far more than the dispersion of possible outcomes
around the expected value of a risky option. We were able to
successfully replicate many of Fischhoff et al.’s 1978 results,
starting with the fact that the rank ordering of the 30 activities
and technologies in their perceived risks and benefits has not
changed since 1978. Additionally, the nine characteristics of
risk investigated by Fischhoff et al. continue to reduce to two
dimensions, dread risk and unknown risk, that together explain a
great deal of the variance in perceived risk across the 30 activities.
Perceived benefit is not related to these factors, but perceived risk
is predicted by both factors, such that technologies or activities
that are higher on dread and are better known tend to receive the
higher risk scores. As in the psychological risk–return framework
developed byWeber (Weber &Milliman, 1997;Weber et al., 2002),
risk acceptability is jointly determined by perceived risks and
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with nuclear power (top), food preservatives (middle), and pesticides (bottom).
The distances between vaccinations and nuclear power in the dread-risk factor
space is underscored by the two items’ very different profiles across the nine risk
characteristics. Althoughvaccinations fall a similar distance from foodpreservatives
and pesticides in the dread–unknown factor space, these risk profiles show them to
be more closely similar to preservatives.
benefits, where perceived risk is influenced by the two factors that
summarize psychological risk dimensions.
Notable differences compared to the 1978 study include the
fact that risks for these 30 activities and technologies appear to
have become more acceptable overall. Although some amount of
variation might be expected across two non-identical populations,
a substantial portion of these differences likely represent real
changes in risk attitudes over time due to two factors: the fact that
the actual risks of many of these items have decreased over the
past three decades, and the fact that these activities have become
more familiar to people. The application of the nine studied risk
characteristics has also changed slightly over time: the dread risk
dimension appears to capture the characteristics of voluntariness
and controllability, which it did not before. This dimension also
now explains more of the variance than it did in the original study,
while the unknown risk dimension explains slightly less of the
variance. In these respects, the current study’s risk dimensions
look more similar to those found in later studies by the same
researchers (Slovic et al., 1985), where the dread risk factor did
include the characteristics ‘‘uncontrollable’’ and ‘‘involuntary’’.
While this studymeets its goal of investigating the current state
of risk perception for 30 activities and technologies, one of its lim-
itations is that comparisons made between the current results and
those from the original 1978 papermust inmost cases be limited to
qualitative statements. Neither the current nor the original study
have large enough samples to allow for a quantitative comparison.Location of Risk Items in the Two-Factor Space (2013)
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Fig. 5. Factor space from Fig. 2 with point size determined by mean perceived
risk for each of the 30 activities/technologies. Though the activity/technology
labels have been removed to make the point size gradient more visible, the
activities/technologies locations are the same as in Fig. 2.
As for the qualitative shifts described above – for example, the dra-
matic drop of nuclear power on the dimension of unknown risk –
this study alone cannot definitively explain why the current data
appear to show a change from the risk attitudes measured in 1978.
For many of these shifts we can identify matching trends in ex-
ternal factors such as regulation or death rates, but to show causal
connections between these trends is beyond the reachof this study.
The speculations made throughout this paper call for dedicated
study of the process behindmany of these apparent changes. In this
sense, this study’s results raise at least as many questions as they
answer. For example, why have vaccines and football shifted up-
ward on the dread and unknown risk dimensions? And howmuch
of the drop in nuclear power on the unknowndimension can be ex-
plained by extrinsic factors such as regulation and improvements
in technologies, versus cognitive effects such as changes in per-
ception due to factors like availability and the relative nature of
risk?
It should also be noted that all of the trends and conclusions
reported here are based on aggregate data. This approach to the
analysis of risk perception has its drawbacks, among them the
loss of variation and detail that an individual-level analysis could
provide, and likely a falsely elevated assumption of consistency
of risk judgments within the same individual (Marris, Langford,
Saunderson, & O’Riordan, 1997). Since Fischhoff et al.’s study in
1978, other researchers have tested models of risk perception
that allow for different patterns among individuals (e.g., Arabie
& Maschmeyer, 1988), and explored similar dimensions of risk
in populations large enough to examine individual-level data on
perception of salient local hazards (Vlek & Stallen, 1981), both
directions that have added much-needed nuance to the field’s
understanding of how people perceive risk. But keeping in mind
the limitations on the conclusions we can draw from the current
study, there is also a benefit from getting a broad look at many
activities and technologies across a range of risk characteristics—
not to mention the advantages of matching Fischhoff et al.’s 1978
methods as closely as possible for the purposes of replicating and
updating their findings.
Our study demonstrates the persistent influence and impor-
tance of qualitative and to a large extent affective dimensions in
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risky choices of decision makers, it may be advisable to supple-
mentmodels like Luce andWeber’s (1986) CERmodel that capture
the influence of quantitative consequentialist dimensions such as
probabilities and outcomes on risk taking with qualitative expe-
riential predictors like the FSLRC1978 psychological risk dimen-
sions. Holtgrave and Weber (1993) did this to explain risk taking
in both financial and health-and-safety decisions made by Univer-
sity of Chicago MBA students and found that both CERmodel com-
ponents and psychological risk dimensions were independent and
significant predictors.
This study also serves as a jumping-off point for a broader
investigation into risk perceptions for some of the most pressing
environmental hazards facing society today. After establishing
the continued usefulness of the psychometric approach to risk
perception in this preliminary study, we can extend the current
line of research to include modern risks such as terrorism and
cell phones, and – more importantly – to understand how people
think differently about risks across various domains, including
natural disasters and global climate change. It has been suggested
that the lack of an inherent dread quality to climate change may
contribute to the public’s hesitance to acknowledge the dangers
it poses (Weber, 2006); however, it remains to be shown that
climate change really inspires less of a dread reaction than other
environmental and technological hazards. The current studymarks
the first step toward a larger body of research that will allow
us to assess climate change as a dread risk, as well as to better
understand other aspects of the ways that people perceive the
risks of environmental and technological hazards in relation to one
another.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2016.05.003.
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